Safety in Australia - 25 Years in Review

Has Occupational Health and Safety in Australia

Progressed in the Last 25 Years?

Critical Reflections of an

Occupational Health and Safety Professional.

Author: George Robotham

Published: February

2000

Contact: fgrobotham@iprimus.com.au

As the new millennium approaches I have reflected upon my approx 25 years in the Occupational

Health and Safety profession and I have to ask myself if the profession has really progressed in that

period.

Here is my story.

I became involved in Occupational Health and Safety in1975 before it became popular and my first

real safety position was as Assistant Safety Adviser with an open-cut mine. I was 21 years of age,

shy and new to the world of mining. Approx 3 months after I started work at the mine an employee

was crushed (spinal column injuries leading to paraplegia) between the shoe and a step protruding

over the shoe of a dragline (massive piece of earthmoving equipment designed to remove the earth

or overburden from above the coal seam) One of the factors essential to the incident was the fixed

nature of the protruding step (approx 3 years later at another mine I saw more draglines being built

with the same design feature. Obviously the company building the machines and the company

ordering the draglines had not learnt from the incident where the employee was made a paraplegic)

The thought occurred to me at this time that there was something fundamentally wrong with the way

safety was being managed in the industry. It would not surprise me if draglines are currently being

built around the world with this same fundamental design feature(one general observation I have is

that as a nation we do not collect and disseminate information about incidents well and consequently

do not learn as well as we could from them)

During my time at this particular mine an office girl was injured in a motor vehicle incident driving a

company car from the nearby town to the mine-site. She was reportedly driving very fast around a

curve, it appeared she was not wearing a seat belt, the car rolled several times and she was

catapulted out through the windscreen .I was quickly on the scene and as I watched her battered

frame while waiting for the ambulance to arrive I felt a strong sense of loss and failure. She died in

hospital the next day. The girl was young, attractive, friendly and very popular. She had every thing

going for her. The reasons which emerged as to why she was driving so fast are quite sensitive but I

have to say society and possibly the safety profession failed her. The people who said she was

doing the wrong thing and got what she deserved did not understand the basis of the problem and

contributed little towards preventing similar incidents

It was about this time that I really thought about the 2 major approaches to safety that are to be

found in most industrialised countries-the behaviourist and the engineering approach. I have heard

strong arguments for and against each approach. There are the behaviourists, the extreme usually

being some employers, who take the view that if only these idiots we have got working for us did the

right thing and were more careful we would not have accidents. These people can tend to blame the

worker without looking carefully at the equipment the workers uses and the environment in which it

is used. They do not consider the impact equipment, environment and systems of work have on

behaviour. I have investigated a number of incidents and initially have been astounded by the

behaviours that contributed to the incident (blaming people for their past actions is usually not a

good way to achieve positive change for the future) In a number of cases however I have found

approaching the investigation with an open mind has led to identifying a number of non-behavioural

factors that can be used to positively influence change for the future. There have been a considerably

lesser number of incidents where I have had to conclude the person’s behaviour was the major

essential factor in the incident and that behaviour change is the only remedy. There may be cases

where it seems counselling and disciplining for doing the wrong thing are the best way of achieving

positive change for the future (I just urge a thorough investigation and advise not to approach it with

the view of only finding fault). The National Safety Council’s “Safe Behaviour Involvement”

programme is probably the most well known behaviour-based safety programme in Australia at the

moment (these programmes are prominent in the United States but I have had problems sorting out

the rhetoric from the fact in reports I have read about the success of their implementation in the

U.S.A.) I remember talking to a foreman at one location I worked at about his experiences as an

infantry soldier in Vietnam, he maintained what kept him alive in a very hostile environment was that

fact he was switched-on, careful all the time and remembered his training. His comments convinced

me there is a lot to be said for a behavioural approach to safety. Implementing a well-structured

Safety programme and creating an expectation of safe behaviour can have significant effects (refer to

the paper “What Makes a Safety Programme Fly” by this author for advice on the necessary

ingredients for a successful safety programme). Some Occupational Health and Safety professionals

whose opinion I respect have told me Dupont behaviour-based approaches to safety have some

merit, I cannot comment as I have not experienced them. Perhaps someone out there could help me

out with information about behaviour-based approaches to safety in Australia?

At the other end of the spectrum are the engineering approach adherents, the extreme being seen in

some union officials. They may tend to blame the employer at all cost and ignore the reality that the

employee must take a duty of care for himself and others around him. They expect the employer to

spend thousands of dollars on extreme safety arrangements when a bit of responsibility can be a

solution. One counter-argument to the engineering approach I had presented to me was that if you

make most things safe by engineering controls, you encourage the worker not to think about his

work and you make it more likely he will come to grief eventually. My experience in Occupational

Health and Safety has lead me to believe the engineering approach was not used enough in the

companies I worked for, there are so many cases where making positive engineering changes

(putting a non-slip coating on a smooth steel-trowelled concrete walkway) are so much more

reliable than truck loads of exhorting people to be careful(walk slowly on that concrete when it is

wet from rain) The good thing about engineering controls is they do not come to work tired, sick,

hungover, drunk, stoned, physically and mentally unsuited to their work, unmotivated, distracted by

personal problems, untrained or for some other reason not really thinking.

Both the engineering and behavioural approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, the wise

manager uses the strengths of each without succoming to the weaknesses. Keep in your mind the

aim of our safety efforts is positive change for the future.

My next safety position was as Safety Adviser with another mine. During my time at this mine an

electrician received serious burns (18 months off work) after a 415 volt electrical explosion. The

consensus of opinion around the mine was that he had done the wrong thing and this was the cause

of the incident. Subsequent investigations revealed, yes, he had done the wrong thing, but there were

clearly good reasons why he did what he did. My view after I really understood what had

happened, was that he was injured because of an inappropriate design feature of the switchboard

he was working on. After this incident the mine engaged Geoff McDonald to lead a Critical Incident

Recall process that extended over some 6 months in the electrical department (critical incident recall

is a structured process where information about critical incidents or near-misses are surfaced and

used as a basis for safety change). I have been to the courses on safety (including those at

universities), attended the safety conferences and seminars, watched the videos, read the books

widely and listened to the so-called safety gurus from overseas (internal to the companies I have

worked for and those external) Nothing has impressed me as much as the work Geoff McDonald

did with critical incident recall. I have written on this subject for the Safety Institute of Australia

journal and speak about it at conferences when I get a chance. To my mind you are failing as an

Occupational Health and Safety professional if you are not using a properly structured programme

of critical incident recall (refer to the paper ”Practical Application of the Critical Incident Recall

Technique” by this author).

Another notable, but tragic event occurred during my time at this mine. The union mine picnic was

held in town and after heavy rain a group of children were amusing themselves by diving into

stormwater drains and riding through the underground water pipes. One child was too big for the

pipe and was trapped underwater and drowned. The local mines rescue squads were called out to

assist and in the retrieval of the child’s body an assistant in the process also died. Myself and approx

5 other people were standing in roughly a foot of muddy water adjacent to the person who died and

we were lucky not to end up with the same fate. We nearly had multiple fatalities due to

circumstances largely unforeseeable and out of control of the people on the scene at the time. 2 lives

were lost due to basic failures in safety.

My next safety position was with an employer organisation. All I will say is that it is a pity industrial

relations practitioners are involved in Occupational Health and Safety decision making, industrial

relations imperatives and Occupational Health and Safety ones are often not compatible.

From this position I moved to a corporate head office position with a major Australian employer.

One of the highlights of this role was working with a very safety committed operations manager. I

conducted a series of safety audits with this manager and was really impressed that this one single

individual, in a senior management position with a strong safety agenda, could make such a

difference (unfortunately managers like this who are willing to really drive safety and create

expectations of a high level of safety performance with managers and subordinates are rare-safety is

really an area where you get the performance you demonstrate you expect)Another highlight of this

period was the introduction of 18 internal standards of Occupational Health and Safety excellence

tailored to the organisations safety needs (standards included those for visitor safety, contractor

safety, compliance with statute law, use of personal protective equipment, management commitment,

hazard identification/risk assessment, safe working procedures, loss prevention & control, employee

involvement, emergency procedures, accident investigation, education/communication, inspections,

health & fitness, injury management). The standards were introduced and a comprehensive auditing

document was produced to aid annual “Executive Safety Audits” at each site. To my mind this

approach was a real turning point for safety in the company and the fact that sites knew they were to

be audited against the standards regularly placed a strong focus on safety. I was so impressed with

this approach that I currently recommend a similar approach.

In this period the company introduced a detailed competency-based approach to training which had

implications for how a range of operational, .maintenance and supervisory tasks were undertaken

(safety was an integral component of the training). I believe the

approach is a vast improvement on traditional methods of safety training (it is backed by sound

research into preferred modes of learning by adults) A comprehensive training needs analysis was

undertaken and the outcome was a series of self-paced training modules the learner could complete

aided by reference to content experts in the workplace. The modules reflected realistic scenarios in

the workplace and involved problem-solving of authentic tasks(the problem-solving, aided by

content experts if necessary was the basis of the learning). A powerful effort was made to relate the

learning to realistic requirements in everyday work. Another training initiative I thought worked well

was a 4 hour Hazard Identification & Control / .Risk Assessment course. Participants were

introduced to a range of hazard types, encouraged to practically identify hazards in a typical

workplace, introduced to a simple method of risk assessment using probability, consequence and

exposure, practiced the simple method of risk assessment on typical workplace tasks and applied a

hierarchy of controls to typical risks. The training was very practical and participants were issued

with a laminated , pocket-sized card outlining the methods. At the end of the training participants

had basic skills in identifying hazards, assessing risk and applying controls to typical risks (these

skills seem necessary for employees to be able to work safely- I have a strong impression

participants thought more about the potential hazards of their work after this training) Some sites

were so impressed with this training that they ensured the whole workforce participated.

During my time in this role a taxonomy of personal damage was produced for the industry. I am

astounded the industry did not use this powerful tool more in it’s accident prevention efforts.

Another initiative I lived through was the introduction of a packaged safety management system. My

experience suggests to me that organisations should not believe these packaged systems are the

single and all-inclusive answer to their safety prayers. They have a place but should be regarded as

an adjunct to and not a replacement for a Safety Management System targeted to the real needs of

the organisation (refer to Australian Standard 4804 for a basic introduction to how to develop a

Safety Management System), Hazard Management Plans that identify the hazards

in the

organisation, their causes and the controls and internal standards of Occupational Health and Safety

excellence tailored to the organisation. These packaged systems can have a place if managed

properly. Managed improperly they can cost considerable time, effort and expense with little real

return. They do however serve as a useful checklist for things to consider for their relevance to your

safety programme.

1994 saw another mining disaster at an Australian mine with 11 men being killed. Occupational

Health and Safety professionals and those with general management responsibilities are urged to

obtain a copy of the Wardens Enquiry into the disaster, it is a chilling tale of how individuals got it

wrong in safety, the report has a number of valuable messages for those interested in safety

management in any industry and emphasises the need for both engineering and behavioural change.

The particular disaster that occurred in 1994 has been a real turning point for safety in the Australian

mining industry and safety is now strongly on the corporate agenda of most mining companies.

Since leaving the employ of mining companies I have been an internal and external Occupational

Health and Safety consultant to a number of companies in a number of industries. I have learnt a lot

in this period, experienced a number of successes and experienced an amount of frustration. Some

of the frustration’s I have experienced include-

The major employer who did not have copies of safety legislation on site. It was explained to me

that as they did not have the legislation on site they did not know about it and thus had good

excuses for not doing it.

The training provider who conducted an Occupational Health and Safety auditors course (a very

practical subject) entirely in a class room with no practical component. My studies towards a

Bachelor of Education(Adult & Workplace Education),past experience conducting safety training

programmes and attending safety training programmes myself has left me with the impression that

a considerable amount of safety education is undertaken without reference to modern adult

learning principles. Interactive approaches and “learning by doing” are particularly appropriate

with adults (refer to the paper ”Adult Learning Principles and Process” by this author)

The company that asked me to develop a Safety Management Plan for them and then had cold

feet when they realised I was actually committing them to do something about safety.

I have had a number of occasions when I have spoken to managers about how safety is managed

in their facility and left the top office with a warm inner-glow after the managers telling me what a

great job they do on safety. I have then examined the implementation of the safety programme in

the real world and gained a vastly different perspective. Fancy professionally printed safety

policies and procedures, incorporated in the Quality Assurance system and found in the

supervisor and managers office do not impress me, what happens where the action happens is

the real test of the safety programme (The best time to assess the adequacy of a safety

programme can be a Monday morning , for outside work it helps if it is pouring down rain,4am is

a good time as people are not really alert then, there is little supervision and shift workers are

recovering from the weekend) Safety audits should identify what happens when normal support

mechanisms are absent and the pressure is on to perform.

A recent project I thought had very positive benefits to the company involved was while I was

working as an external Occupational Health and Safety consultant and involved developing hazard

management plans for an underground coal mine(underground coal mining can be a very hazardous

operation and as such detailed plans are necessary for management of principal hazards - in the

scope of this work a principal hazard was one with the potential to result in one or more fatalities) A

risk management approach was taken where principal hazards were identified in each of the discrete

business activities of the client company. By using a cross-sectional slice of the workforce in group

meetings causes of hazards were identified and recorded on fault-trees Existing and desired controls

were identified for each cause. For principal hazards it is suggested one should have at least 1

control in each box of the 9 box model (the 9 box model was developed by the Australian risk

management consultancy company A.C.I.R.L.).

9 BOX MODEL FOR CONTROLS

Prevention

Monitoring

Contingency

Eqpt./Engineering

Procedures

Skills/Competencies

With reference to the 9 box model a study into safety management in one company I was associated

with revealed they had a lot of prevention controls and the contingency controls (emergency

communications procedures, trained rescue-squad members, nice trucks with flashing red lights, lots

of first-aid boxes etc) were well developed. Where the company fell down was on monitoring their

prevention controls to ensure they were always effective, there is probably a message for a lot of

companies in this study.

Once existing controls are identified we need to audit them to assess if they are really effective and

working in the real world. New controls have to be implemented. Persons responsible for the

controls have to be identified (you need to consider what happens when the person responsible for

the control is absent from site) Identifying if those responsible for the controls have the required

competencies is an important part of the process as is the follow-up training. The approach that was

undertaken was a rigorous one, more complex than outlined briefly here and took a considerable

period of time to implement. The company ended up deciding it was necessary to have approx 1600

controls in place and working properly for effective management of principal hazards(this

emphasises the complex nature of managing safety in a high risk environment) The process used is

relatively simple but thorough and can be applied to any high risk industry not just mining (refer to

the paper “The Hazard Management Process” by this author).

In the early 1980’s I attended the Graduate Diploma in Occupational Hazard Management course

at Ballarat university and felt this helped me in my role as a mine-site Safety Adviser. In 1997 my

wife completed a post-graduate Occupational Health and Safety qualification. In reviewing her

assignments, answering her questions and reading her text- books I formed the impression that the

course had not really moved on from my days at Ballarat. I have some doubts post-graduate

Occupational Health and Safety education at universities really equips the graduate to perform well

in what can be an extremely demanding role. Detailed training on how to establish a safety

management system seems to be a difficult area for training organisations to come to grips with.

When one accesses the Internet and sees how well developed Occupational Health and Safety

education/training is in many overseas countries one is tempted to believe Australia is lagging

behind(the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health & Safety, Ontario Industrial Accident

Prevention Foundation and the United Kingdom Institute of Occupational Safety & Health are

web-sites worth visiting). Based on my experience in the field I take the view that we do not have a

very organised approach to Occupational Health and Safety in Australia and that our training for

managers and Occupational Health and Safety professionals is partly responsible. My studies in

Adult and Workplace Education have revealed a sound theoretical basis to the profession and I

would suggest that a sound theoretical basis is absent with the way the safety part of Occupational

Health and Safety is taught in Australia.

So in 1999 what is my opinion of how far the Occupational Health and Safety profession has

progressed in the last 25 years.?

There was a serious incident at a Qld. mine recently where an employee was caught in part of

underground mining equipment and his legs had to be amputated to free him. My wife has a caring,

intelligent female friend who made the comment to us that according to the paper the incident was

the individuals fault. I am not familiar with the particular incident so can not comment on factors

essential to the occurrence. As a safety professional I was tempted to remonstrate with her and

explain the realities of an employers common law duties and how an incident is a complex mixture of

person, machine and environment factors and that there is likely to be a lot more to the incident than

simply saying it was the individuals fault. I thought better of it as this is really a societal problem. This

comment of our friend said to me that the safety profession in Australia really had not made many

gains in the last 25 years.

An estimate of the cost of workplace accidents and disease in Australia that sticks in my mind is one

from Worksafe Australia where they estimated the cost as a minimum of $27 Billion annually (other

than the people who are seriously hurt and the safety professionals who really knows or cares about

the incidence of workplace accidents and disease in Australia?)

Some of the problems I currently see with Occupational Health and Safety in Australia include

these-

There is only half-hearted leadership from government , unions and many companies with regard

to safety. Admitting to being a cynic I suggest the rhetoric is not always accompanied by action. I

suppose it is naive to think the tripartite partners can put aside their industrial and political agenda

when discussing safety.

The media emphasises personal fault in news releases about incidents and does not consider

design and system issues that contribute to incidents.

We do not have a centralised, consistent method of reporting and recording incident and disease

statistics. How can we examine the beast and learn from it if we do not record and report it in a

consistent manner?

In business vast amounts of money can be spent on safety without really defining desired

outcomes (I am not doubting peoples motives however, just their effectiveness)

Government, unions and many companies treat safety as a second priority and industrial relations

imperititives dominate.

The standard of Occupational Health and Safety practitioner may not be as high as it could be.

In Qld the basic requirement to become a qualified Workplace Health Safety Officer is 2

courses of a total duration of some 2 weeks. It is difficult to think we can have a truly

professional approach to Occupational Health and Safety with a practitioner who has only

received 2 weeks training (most of this training is on the particular states safety legislation and

there is little on modern safety management techniques).Managing Occupational Health and

Safety successfully is very complex and companies really need professional, high quality advice

to assist them if we are going to advance. I see some advantages in a government accredited

safety officer course but it runs the risk that employers only look for this qualification when

employing safety staff. That is not to say that committed people with just this qualification and

operating within their limitations can not have some effect.

The messages of past incidents are not utilised enough in safety decision making. For this to

happen past incident information has to be collected ,presented and organised in a useable

manner.

The Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate predominates discussions about safety performance. How

can a company be proud of a decrease of L.T.I.F.R. from 60 to 10 if there have been 2 fatalities

and 1 case of paraplegia amongst the lost time injuries? The L.T.I.F.R. trivialises serious personal

damage and is a totally inappropriate measure of safety performance. When I worked in the

mining industry we used positive measures of how much coal we mined, the cubic metres of

overburden the draglines had moved, the number of haultruck tyres fitted in a certain time period

and the amount of product coal that went through the washplant. Putting measures on our failures

such as reporting accident statistics instead of our successes always seemed counter-productive.

With a bit of thought companies can devise positive measures of what is being done to improve

safety and this seems more appropriate to me than counting accidents. L.T.I.F.R.. is an outcome

measure not a measure of what the company is doing to improve safety performance.

My grandmother used to say “Look after the pence and the pounds will look after themselves” In

the world of traditional safety there seems to be similar thinking that if you prevent minor damage

you will automatically prevent major damage. Accident ratio studies (insisting on set ratios between

near misses, minor accidents and serious accidents) are prominent and accepted unthinkingly. The

result is a furious effort to eliminate lost time injuries in the belief that major incidents will be

eliminated in the process. Certainly there are minor incidents that have the potential to result in more

extensive damage( and we should learn from them) ,but personal experience tells me the majority of

minor damage incidents do not have this potential. It is a matter of looking at the energy that was

available to be exchanged in the incident . The concept that preventing the minor incidents will

automatically prevent the major ones seems to me to be fundamentally flawed. All organisations

have limited resources to devote to safety, it seems more efficient to prevent one incident resulting in

paraplegia than to prevent 20 incidents where people have a couple of days off work (some will say

this comment is heresy) Somewhere in the push to reduce L.T.I’s ,reduce the L.T.I.F.R. and

consequently achieve good ratings in safety programme audits the focus on serious personal

damage tends to be lost. I know of companies that have made great reductions in L.T.I.F.R. yet

they are still seriously injuring their people.

“Systems Safety” as opposed to traditional safety is used by companies more successful in safety

and the focus is on the high risk end of the spectrum.

A method of classifying personal damage that seems appropriate is the following-

CLASS 1-Damage that permanently alters a persons life eg death, paraplegia, amputation of a leg,

severe psychological damage.

CLASS 2- Damage that temporarily alters a persons life eg fractured leg that repairs with no lasting

impediment ,deep laceration that has no underlying tissue damage and repairs without significant

scarring

CLASS 3 Inconveniences a persons life

The report of the Industry Commission(1) 1995 indicates that safety in Australia is fundamentally a

class 1 problem (87% of occurrences were class 2 with18% of cost,13% of occurrences were class

1 with 82% of cost) This report further strengthens the argument that instead of concentrating on

reducing L.T.I.F.R. we should be focusing on Class 1 damage reduction. Class 1 incidents have

more energy available to be exchanged than the usual Lost Time Injury and thus require a different

preventative approach. Methods of class 1 damage reduction can be found in the paper” Change

For The Future-Not Blame For The Past” G.L.McDonald (2)

The message about class 1 damage reduction has yet to sink in to many peoples minds.

In my view Occupational Health and Safety in Australia has made some gains in the last 25 years

but when one compares these gains with advances in other spheres of industry and overseas

approaches to the function, I would suggest Occupational Health and Safety in Australia does not

compare favourably.

I welcome your comments.(anyone wishing copies of the papers mentioned or wishing to comment

direct to me can reach me on g_robotham@one.net.au)

References

Industry Commission.1995.”Work.Health & Safety”, Inquiry into Occupational Health and

Safety ,Report No.47.Vols 1&2.Industry Commission,LB2 Collins St. Melbourne, Australian

Government Publishing Service

“Change For The Future-Not Blame For The Past”, G.L. McDonald.M.E.,B.Sc., Principal

Geoff McDonald & Associates, Brisbane